Product Overview
From Follett
"September 2016.";"June 28, 2016; approved by the African Department; prepared by Vincent Fleuriet, Jose Gijon, Gabriel Leost, Koffie Nassar, Du Prince Tchakote, Marie-Christine Uguen, and Jean van Houtte, team led by Mario de Zamaroczy"--Page 2 of pdf.;Includes bibliographical references.;CEMAC--reserves management -- CEMAC--debt sustainability analysis -- CEMAC--institutions and medium-term fiscal framework -- CEMAC--implementation of the harmonized public financial framework -- CEMAC--developments in the public securities market.;Description based on online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org website, viewed October 7, 2016). This paper assesses the appropriate level of international reserves for the Economic and Monetary community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and reviews the impact of the current oil-price slump. Standard approaches to reserve adequacy recommend a reserve coverage of five months of prospective imports for a commodity-dependent monetary union. Under the current outlook for oil prices, prospects for maintaining reserve coverage at this level are challenging. Against this background, the paper offers proposals to reform the CEMAC’s reserve management framework. -- The risk of external debt distress for the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), as a whole, is moderate, despite a steady increase in the debt burden. None of the policy-dependent thresholds is breached under the baseline scenario. However, all five thresholds are breached under at least one of the standard stress tests, which points to risks to macroeconomic stability. CEMAC should implement an active and effective region-wide risk management framework for external debt sustainability. --
From the Publisher
This Selected Issues paper assesses the appropriate level of international reserves for the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. The management of the regional central bank's (BEAC's) international reserves is governed by monetary cooperation agreements with France. In view of current risks, it is suggested that the BEAC should define its target level of international reserves. The BEAC should have a framework that reflects fairly each member state's contribution to the pooled reserves. The enforcement of the surrender requirement should be based on a finding of noncompliance even if the target level is achieved. The institutional framework for reserve management should also provide for the achievement of the target level.